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FEDERAL INCOME TAX
TREATMENT OF THE ACQUISITION
AND DISPOSITION OF COAL
INTERESTS: AN EXAMINATION OF
I.R.C. § 631(c)
JOHN C. COGGIN, HI*
I. THE "ECONOMIC INTEREST" CONCEPT
There is perhaps no more important concept in the federal
income taxation of mineral resources than the "economic inter-
est" concept.1 In particular, a complete understanding of that
concept as developed by the courts and as set forth in the regula-
tions is essential in order to properly understand the tax conse-
quences resulting from the acquisition and disposition of coal
properties for two basic reasons. First, it is necessary that the tax-
payer have an economic interest in the coal in order to be entitled
to claim a depletion deduction, be it cost or percentage deple-
tion.2 Second, the taxpayer must retain an economic interest in
the coal upon its disposition in order for him to be entitled to
capital gains treatment on the proceeds received under the terms
of the transaction, an important tax benefit available under sec-
tion 631(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.
With regard to the depletion allowance, the taxpayer must
* Partner, North, Haskell, Slaughter, Young & Lewis, Birmingham, Alabama.
B.S., University of Alabama, 1970; M.A., University of Alabama, 1970; J.D., Uni-
versity of Alabama, 1973.
Author's Note. This article primarily addresses the dispositon of coal inter-
ests. However, I.R.C. § 631(c) also applies to iron ore. The discussion in this arti-
cle with regard to coal also applies to iron ore, except in those areas where a dif-
ferent tax treatment is expressly mentioned.
' The concept has received much attention by both the commentators and
the courts. Pratt & Ferguson, Depletion Deduction in Coal Leases: Courts Split
on the Effect of Lease Terminability, J. TAx. 240 (October 1979); Casey, Eco-
nomic Interest-Play It Again, Sam, 24 TAx. LAW. 129 (1970); Blackburn, Sale of
Lease? Disparate Tax Treatment of Mineral Transactions by Courts Based on
Nature of Minerals Involved, 42 Tax. L. Rav. 706 (1964); Sneed, Economic Inter-
est-An Expanding Concept, 35 Tax. L. Rlv. 307 (1957).
' Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1), T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 317.
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possess an economic interest in the coal in place which will not
terminate until the coal has been exhausted in order to be enti-
tled to the deduction. The regulations under section 611 of the
Code in this regard provide:
Annual depletion deductions are allowed only to the owner of
an economic interest in mineral deposits .... An economic
interest is possessed in every case in which the taxpayer has
acquired by investment any interest in mineral in place...
and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived
from the extraction of the mineral ... to which he must look
for a return of his capital.3
It would thus appear that the regulations establish two re-
quirements in order for a taxpayer to qualify for the depletion
deduction. The first requirement is an interest in the coal in place
acquired by an investment, an interest interpreted by the courts
to include the right to mine the coal until exhaustion. This re-
quirement has led to the denial of the depletion deduction by sev-
eral courts in cases in which the party claiming the deduction had
the rights to mine the mineral under an agreement which could
be terminated without cause and on short notice.' The Service's
position has been that if the lease agreement can be terminated
by either party at will "or on notice that will not allow the opera-
tor to extract a substantial portion of the mineral in place," the
coal operator will not be in possession of an economic interest.5
On the other hand, the Court of Claims has consistently taken
the opposite point of view under somewhat identical circum-
stances.6 Although there is an ostensible conflict between the po-
sition of the Tax Court and the Court of Claims on the issue of
the effect upon the depletion allowance of a short term termina-
bility clause, the positions of the courts probably can be recon-
ciled when the facts of each case are considered and when the
3Id.
4 Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (1959); Winters Coal Co. v. Commissioner,
57 T.C. 249 (1971), rev'd, 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974); McCall v. Commissioner,
37 T.C. 674 (1962), affd, 312 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1963). For a detailed examination,
see Bulleit, A Tax Incentive Approach to the Depletion Allowance Dilemna, 82
W. Va. L. Rev. 1115 (1980).
5 Rev. Rul. 77-481, 1977-2 C.B. 205.
0 Swank v. United States, 602 F.2d 348 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Thornberry Constr. Co.
v. United States, 576 F.2d 346 (Ct. CL 1978); Bakertown Coal Co. v. United
States, 485 F.2d 633 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
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provisions of section 631(c) that prohibit percentage depletion to
a lessor are also taken into account. In any event, the United
States Supreme Court which granted certiorari in Swank v.
United States on May 12, 1980, will probably soon resolve the
conflict.
The second requirement for a taxpayer to be entitled to the
depletion allowance is that income be derived from the extraction
and sale of the mineral. Hence, a party selling a mineral deposit
in place for a fixed amount is not entitled to depletion, since the
seller in such case will not be looking to the extraction and subse-
quent sale of the mineral for income.
In the early days of income tax administration, it was con-
tended that only the fee owner of the mineral in place was en-
titled to a depletion deduction. However, the United States Su-
preme Court as early as 1925 held that a lessee of mineral assets
was entitled to depletion.7 In that case the Court, recognizing that
a lease was tantamount to a property right entitling the lessee to
mine and remove the minerals, determined that such a right
would bestow the required economic interest. Section 611 of the
Code, as well, now specifically recognizes a depletion deduction
for the lessee of mineral rights and requires that the deduction be
equitably apportioned between the lessor and lessee.
Because it is the economic substance rather than the form of
a transaction which determines the existence of an economic in-
terest, it is immaterial whether the technical legal title to the
property under state law is transferred with a right to share in
the mineral or proceeds therefrom. Thus, the United States Su-
preme Court has held that an adjacent landowner, the use of
whose land was necessary in order to extract the mineral, ac-
quired an economic interest in the mineral in place by dedicating
the use of the property to the extraction of the mineral until such
mineral was exhausted.8
The definition of "economic interest" as contained in the
present regulations originated with Palmer v. Bender," the 1933
hallmark decision of the United States Supreme Court. In the
7 Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364 (1925).
8 Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956).
9 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
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Palmer case the taxpayer, after acquiring oil and gas leases on
certain property, in turn leased the property to an oil company
for a cash bonus and a production royalty. The taxpayer, as a
sublessor, claimed the depletion deduction on the oil proceeds.
The Service took the position that the taxpayer as a sublessor was
not entitled to claim a depletion on its proceeds from the oil pro-
duction. The Supreme Court, holding that the sublessor was enti-
tled to the depletion allowance, observed:
[T]he lessor's right to a depletion allowance does not depend
upon his retention of ownership or any other particular form
of legal interest in the mineral content of the land. It is
enough, if by virtue of the leasing transaction, he has retained
a right to share in the oil produced. If so, he has an economic
interest in the oil in place, which is depleted by production.
In the present case, the two partnerships acquired by the
leases to them, complete legal control of the oil, in place. Even
though legal ownership of it, in a technical sense, remained in
their lessor, they as lessees, nevertheless acquired an economic
interest in it which represented their capital investment and
was subject to depletion under the statute .... When the two
lessees transferred their operating rights to the two oil compa-
nies, whether they became technical sublessors or not, they re-
tained, by their stipulations for royalties, an economic interest
in the oil, in place, identical with that of a lessor.. . . Thus,
throughout their changing relationships with respect to the
properties, the oil in the ground was a reservoir of capital in-
vestment of the several parties, all of whom, the original les-
sors, the two partnerships, and their transferees, were entitled
to share in the oil produced. Production and sale of the oil
would result in its depletion and also in a return of capital
investment to the parties according to their respective
interests.10
The Supreme Court, in rendering its ruling in the Palmer
case, held that in order to be afforded the depletion deduction, a
taxpayer must possess "an economic interest" in the minerals.
The Court went on to define such an interest as existing in "every
case in which the taxpayer has acquired by investment, any inter-
est in the. . .[minerals]. . .in place and secures by any form of
legal relationship, income from the extraction of the . . .[miner-
10 Id. at 557-58.
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als]... to which he must look for a return of his capital." '11 The
definition of "economic interest," as originally announced in
Palmer v. Bender and as subsequently adopted by the Service in
the regulations, 12 has been consistently followed by the Supreme
Court.13
II. TAx TREATMENT OF MINERAL INTERESTS OTHER THAN COAL
It is essential to understand the tax treatment accorded the
acquisition and disposition of mineral interests other than coal in
order to properly appreciate the unique tax treatment available to
coal under section 631(c).
In the typical situation, the owner of the mineral interests
other than coal is entitled to capital gain income only when the
entire fee interest in the minerals is "sold." The principle has
been developed in tax law that, in order for a transaction involv-
ing the extraction and removal of mineral deposits from land to
be deemed a "sale," the owner must alienate himself from all in-
terests in the mineral as a result of the transaction. 4 Thus, the
United States Supreme Court has held that proceeds paid pursu-
ant to an agreement in the nature of a mineral "lease" are not
gains from the sale of capital assets, and hence, are not entitled to
capital gains treatment. 5 Although this case did not set forth any
guidelines for determining whether a given agreement would con-
stitute a sale or a lease, later cases have examined the various
factors which influence that determination. 16
In the typical situation involving mineral interests, it is
therefore necessary that there be a complete alienation of all eco-
nomic interests in the minerals in order for the transaction to be
deemed a "sale" and therefore to be accorded capital gains treat-
ment. If an economic interest in the deposits is retained by the
taxpayer, the transaction is usually not regarded as a "sale" for
tax purposes. As a significant consequence, the proceeds of the
2 Id. at 557.
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1), T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 317.
13 E.g., Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1965).
14 See, e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
15 Id.
16 Freund v. United States, 367 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1966); Albritton v. Com-
missioner, 248 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1957); Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1957).
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transaction must be reported for tax purposes as ordinary income,
subject to the applicable depletion deduction.
An example of the foregoing basic tax principle is contained
in the case of Freund v. United States.17 In the Freund case, cap-
ital gains treatment of the proceeds paid to the lessor of mineral
rights was denied. There the taxpayer had entered into an agree-
ment with a sand and gravel company giving that lessee five years
usage of its land for the purpose of mining and processing sand
and gravel. In return for entering into the lease, the taxpayer was
to receive twelve cents per ton on the aggregate materials re-
moved from the premises, and a minimum payment equal to
twelve thousand dollars per year. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the agreement was a lease with a retained eco-
nomic interest in the taxpayer rather than an absolute sale of the
sand and gravel in place, and thus the income was subject to ordi-
nary income tax treatment.
Another example of this basic tax principle is illustrated by
the Fifth Circuit case of Albritton v. Commissioner.8 In the Al-
britton case, the taxpayer executed an agreement requiring roy-
alty payments measured by a fixed percentage of the retail sale
value of the sand and gravel removed from the property. The
Fifth Circuit held that, since the taxpayer had retained an eco-
nomic interest in the property, the proceeds were to be treated as
ordinary income, subject to the applicable percentage depletion
deduction.
The foregoing brief examination of the basic tax principles
involved in the disposition of mineral interests other than coal
illustrates the unique tax treatment which has been accorded coal
-by Congress. Under section 631(c), the disposition of coal, even
though an economic interest is retained, is treated for tax pur-
poses as a "sale" of a section 1231 asset. As illustrated in the fore-
going cases, this tax treatment is diametrically opposite to that
accorded other minerals, whose owners must demonstrate that a
bona fide sale of a deposit has occurred and that all economic
interests in the deposit have been alienated before such taxpayers
can treat the transaction as the sale of a capital asset.
.7 367 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1966).
18 248 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1957).
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In the typical mineral transaction, a taxpayer's retention* of
an "economic interest" in the minerals will prevent the transac-
tion from being characterized as a "sale" for ta purposes and,
therefore, will preclude capital gains treatment on the proceeds.
In the usual case, if the Service deems the arrangement to be
merely a lease of the mineral interests (and thus a disposition of
the mineral with a retained economic interest), the proceeds to
the lessor must be reported as ordinary income subject to the ap-
plicable depletion allowance.21 The significance of the tax conces-
sion which Congress has made to owners of coal through section
631(c) should now become apparent. The owner of a coal deposit
may retain an economic interest, as in a lease arrangement, and
still be entitled to capital gains treatment upon the disposition of
the coal.
It should be noted that a taxpayer may elect to sell coal
outside the special provisions of section 631(c). The taxpayer may
elect to do this by simply selling the coal deposit outright to an-
other party for a fixed sum rather than leasing the coal property
and receiving a certain amount per ton of coal extracted by the
lessee. However, where a sale of coal does not qualify for capital
gains treatment under section 631(c), the tax treatment accorded
the transaction depends upon whether the coal properties are
classified as capital assets or as property held by the taxpayer pri-
marily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or
business.
If the taxpayer cannot demonstrate an investment intent,
and if the coal is property held for sale in the ordinary course of
business, then the sale of the coal will result in ordinary income
to the taxpayer. The courts have consistently taken this position
with respect to those sales of timber which fail to qualify under
the analogous provisions of section 631(b). 20 In the alternative, if
a taxpayer can demonstrate that the coal property which has
been disposed of has been held primarily for investment and not
for sale, then the taxpayer will be entitled to the tax treatment
19 Albritton v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1957). See also Rose v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 185 (1971).
20 Crosby v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 314 (S.D. Miss. 1968), affd, 414 F.2d
822 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Wineberg v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 157 (9th Cir.
1964).
11451980]
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accorded any other capital asset.2 1 It should be obvious though
that the sale of coal outright by a coal company engaged in leas-
ing or subleasing coal property would be inadvisable, since the
Service probably would take the position that the coal was not a
"capital asset" but rather constituted "inventory" of the coal
company, and as a result the coal company would realize ordinary
income from the sale. Thus, the utilization of section 631(c) in the
case of a coal company disposing of its coal interests may very
well be mandatory in order to obtain the most advantageous tax
treatment.
III. ACQUISITION AND DIsoSMO N OF COAL INTERESTS UNDER
SECTION 631(c)
A. History of Section 631(c)
As early as 1943, timber owners obtained a special concession
from Congress which allowed them capital gains treatment with
respect to the proceeds of certain leasing transactions.2 2 The same
tax benefits were extended to the recipients of coal royalties be-ginning in 1951.23 By granting capital gains treatment for certain
coal royalties, Congress was in effect granting a tax subsidy to the
coal industry.24 The capital gains treatment'was made available in
the case of coal royalties to encourage production at a time when
the coal industry was facing strong competition from alternative
fuels.25 Congress likewise extended this tax subsidy in 1964 to the
owners of iron ore in order to encourage leasing (and therefore
production) of that mineral2 6
When iron ore was added to section 631(c), certain restric-
tions were also imposed. First, the statute was made applicable
2 Butler Consol. Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 183 (1946); Harman v.
Commissioner, 4 T.C. 335 (1944).
11 Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 127, 58 Stat. 21 (1944) (formerly 26 U.S.C.
§ 117(k)) (current version at I.R.C. § 631(b)). This statute provided that timber
owners who disposed of timber under a cutting contract, retaining an economic
interest, were entitled to § 117(j) treatment (now I.R.C. § 1231).
" Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 183, § 325(b), 65 Stat. 452 (1951) (for-
merly codified at 26 U.S.C. § 117(k) (current version at I.R.C. § 631(c)).
24 S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 42, 43 (1951); H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 31, 32 (1951).
15 H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1963).
26 S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 253 (1964).
1146 [Vol. 82
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 4 [1980], Art. 44
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol82/iss4/44
TAX SYMPOSIUM
only to disposals of iron ore mined in the United States. However,
Congress did not impose a geographical restriction with respect to
coal.
In addition, Congress greatly restricted the use of section
631(c) as to the disposal of iron ore between related taxpayers. Its
benefits are not available with regard to any disposal of iron ore
to a person whose relationship to the person disposing of such
iron ore would result in the disallowance of losses under sections
267 or 707(b) of the Code, nor to any disposal of iron ore to a
person owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same in-
terests which own or control the person disposing of such iron
ore. It is important to note that Congress did not extend this re-
striction between related taxpayers to transactions of coal proper-
ties. Section IV of this article will examine in greater detail the
application of section 631(c) in such instances.
In analyzing the tax treatment to be accorded any transac-
tion involving coal interests, it is crucial to appreciate the inter-
play between section 611 of the Code, dealing with the depletion
allowance, and section 631(c), dealing with the income tax treat-
ment to be accorded a taxpayer's gain or loss upon the disposal of
coal with a retained economic interest. Section 611(a) provides for
a "reasonable allowance for depletion. . according to the pecu-
liar conditions in each case; such reasonable allowance in all cases
to be made under regulations prescribed by the Secretary. .. .
The depletion deduction is designed to permit the taxpayer to
recoup its capital investment in the minerals so that, when the
mineral is exhausted, the taxpayer's capital is in effect
unimpaired.17
In the case of mineral resources such as coal, the allowance
for depletion is computed upon either the adjusted depletion
basis of the property (known as the cost depletion method)28 or
upon a percentage of gross income from the property (known as
the percentage depletion method),2 9 whichever results in the
greater allowance for depletion for any taxable year.30 Cost deple-
tion is determined by dividing the tax cost basis of the depletable
27 Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 312 (1956).
"8 See LR.C. § 612.
29 See I.R.C. § 613.
30 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(a)(1), T.D. 6446, 1960-1 C.B. 208.
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natural resource by the number of units estimated to be con-
tained in the deposit. The quotient is the cost depletion per unit.
The depletion deduction for the year is determined by multiply-
ing the number of units extracted and sold during the year by the
cost depletion per unit.3 1
Under percentage depletion, the alternative method, a flat
percentage of the gross income realized during the year from the
property is allowed as the depletion deduction.3 2 This deduction
may not exceed fifty percent of the taxable income from the prop-
erty, computed without regard to the depletion allowance.33 Per-
centage depletion typically results in a larger deduction than the
cost depletion method.
In the case of leased property, depletion deductions must be
equitably apportioned between the lessor and the lessee.34 Al-
though section 611(b) establishes an equitable apportionment of
the depletion allowance between those parties, this provision of
the Code must be read in conjunction with section 631(c), which
provides that an owner who disposes of coal under any form of
contract in which he retains an economic interest in the mineral
is not entitled to percentage depletion on the income received
upon the disposal.3 5 Rather, the royalties received are subject to
capital gains treatment, without the benefit of percentage deple-
tion. The result of the operation of these two sections is that, in
the typical leasing situation, the lessee becomes entitled to the
entire depletion allowance and deducts it from the gross income
gained by the sale of the coal while the lessor is entitled to report
its royalty proceeds from the leasing of the coal at capital gains
rates.38
B. Statutory Requirements of Section 631(c)
The language of section 631(c) is deceptively simple and
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2, T.D. 6446, 1960-1 C.B. 208.
For coal, the allowance is ten percent. LR.C. § 613(b)(4).
33LR.C. § 613(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(1), T.D. 7170, 1972-1 C.B. 178.
LR.C. § 611(b)(1).
Rev. Rul. 59-416, 1959-2 C.B. 159; Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(4), T.D. 6841,
1965-2 C.B. 200.
31 See, e.g., Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624, 632-33
(1965).
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straightforward.37 It should initially be noted that it is not an
elective provision. If the requirements of the section are met, the
statute will apply to the transaction irrespective of the wishes of
the taxpayer. Analyzing its prerequisites, section 631(c) provides
that a "disposal" of coal is deemed to be a sale where (1) the coal
has been held for more than one year before such disposal; (2) the
disposing taxpayer is the "owner" of the coal; and (3) the disposal
is under any form of contract by virtue of which such owner re-
tains an economic interest in the coal. There are thus three basic
requirements for the applicability of the statute to a transaction:
the holding period requirement of one year; an ownership require-
ment; and a disposition requirement under which the property
must be transferred pursuant to a special type of contract
whereby the disposing party retains an economic interest in the
37 The section provides:
In the case of the disposal of coal (including lignite), or iron ore
mined in the United States, held for more than 1 year before such dis-
posal, by the owner thereof under any form of contract by virtue of
which such owner retains an economic interest in such coal or iron ore,
the difference between the amount realized from the disposal of such
coal or iron ore and the adjusted depletion basis thereof plus the deduc-
tions disallowed for the taxable year under section 272 shall be consid-
ered as though it were a gain or loss, as the case may be, on the sale of
such coal or iron ore. Such owner shall not be entitled to the allowance
for percentage depleton provided in section 613 with respect to such
coal or iron ore. This subsection shall not apply to income realized by
any owner as a co-adventurer, partner, or principal in the mining of
such coal or iron ore, and the word "owner" means any person who owns
an economic interest in coal or iron ore in place, including a sublessor.
The date of disposal of such coal or iron ore shall be deemed to be the
date such coal or iron ore is mined. In determining the gross income, the
adjusted gross income, or the taxable income of the lessee the deduc-
tions allowable with respect to rents and royalties shall be determined
without regard to the provisions of this subsection. This subsection shall
have no application, for purposes of applying subchapter G, relating to
corporations used to avoid income tax on shareholders (including the
determinations of the amount of the deductions under section 535(b)(6)
or section 545(b)(5)). This subsection shall not apply to any disposal of
iron ore-
(1) to a person whose relationship to the person disposing of such
iron ore would result in the disallowance of losses under Section 267 or
707(b), or
(2) to a person owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
same interests which own or control the person disposing of such iron
ore.
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coal. If section 631(c) applies, the coal becomes a section 1231
asset and is eligible for section 1231 treatment. 8 This is the case
regardless of whether the coal is held as a part of the owner's
inventory for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its busi-
ness. The difference between the amount realized from the dispo-
sal of the coal and the adjusted depletion basis thereof (plus the
deductions disallowed for the taxable year under section 272)39 is
accorded capital gains treatment.40
- I.I.C. § 1231(b)(2). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1(c)(3), T.D. 6841, 1965-2
C.B. 200.
39 Section 272 provides a special tax treatment for the expenses incurred by a
taxpayer in making and administering a contract for the disposal of coal pursuant
to § 631(c). The expenditures referred to in § 272 include such items as ad
valorem taxes, fire protection, insurance (other than liability insuarnce), adminis-
trative costs, interest on loans, legal and technical expenses, and expenses of mea-
suring and checking quantities of coal disposed of under the contract. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.272-1(d)(1), T.D. 6841, 1965-2 C.B. 200. It has been held that state income
taxes on iron ore royalties are not allowable expenditures under I.R.C. § 272, and
thus taxpayers may only deduct them from ordinary income rather than adding
those taxes to basis under I.R.C. § 631(c). Higgins Co. v. United States, 39 AFTR
2d 77-702 (D. Minn. 1977), aff'd, 566 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1977). The same rule
would presumably apply to coal.
Although § 272 itself precludes a deduction for these items, they are added to
the adjusted depletion basis of the coal for purposes of computing gain or loss
under § 631(c). However, in the event that these expenditures plus the adjusted
depletion basis of the coal disposed of in any taxable year exceeds the amount
realized under the § 631(c) contract during such taxable year, such excess is con-
sidered under § 1231 as a loss from the sale of property used in the trade or busi-
ness. Tress. Reg. § 1.272-1(c), T.D. 6841, 1965-2 C.B. 200. Any excess not used as
a reduction of gain under that section is a deductible loss under § 165(a). I.R.C.
§ 272. Where no gross royalty income is realized under the contract of disposal in
a particular taxable year, the expenditures are treated without regard to § 272. Id.
In addition, the provisions of that section have no applicaton for purposes of com-
puting personal holding company income under § 543. Tress. Reg. § 1.272-1(e),
T.D. 6841, 1965-2 C.B. 200 provides in pertinent part-
For example, the taxpayer may, for the purposes of section 543(a)(3)(C)
or the corresponding provisions of prior income tax laws, include in the
sum of the deductions which are allowable under Section 162 an amount
paid to an attorney as compensation for legal services rendered in con-
nection with the making of a coal royalty contract or iron ore royalty
contract (assuming the expenditure otherwise qualifies under section
162 as an ordinary necessary expense incurred in the taxpayer's trade or
business), even though such expenditure is disallowed as a deduction
under section 272.
40 I.R.C. §§ 631(c), 1231(b)(2).
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1. Holding Period Requirement
For determining the bounds of the one year holding period,
section 631(c) provides that "the date of disposal ... shall be
deemed to be the date such coal or iron ore is mined." Congress
saw fit to insert this language into the statute in an effort to clar-
ify the considerable uncertainty- that had arisen under the compa-
rable statute dealing with timber leasing. The confusion arose
from a Tax Court decision which held, under the particular facts
in that case, that disposal of timber occurred when the lease was
made, and not when the timber was cut.4' The insertion of the
foregoing language into the statute removed the confusion by pro-
viding that the lessor's holding period should run to the time the
coal is actually mined. 2 If the coal has been held for more than
one year on the date it is mined, it is immaterial that it had not
been held for more than one year on the date the contract of dis-
position was executed by the owner of the coal deposit.
43
The fact that the disposition date for purposes of section
631(c) is keyed to the date of mining rather than the date on
which the rights to it are granted or conveyed is of paramount
importance for planning purposes. This is particularly true with
respect to a sublessor that intends to dispose of the coal pursuant
to a section 631(c) lease. If the coal is mined after one year from
the effective date of the lease from the landowners to the subles-
sor, then the sublessor will be entitled to capital gains upon its
disposal of the rights to its sublessee. The sublessor does not have
41 Springfield Plywood Corp. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 697 (1950).
42 S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1951).
43 Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(b)(1), T.D. 6841, 1965-2 C.B. 200. See also Union
Bag-Camp Paper Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 730 (Ct. Cl. 1963). There, the
court held that the taxpayer was the "owner" of the timber disposed of to third
parties under cutting contracts, and that it was entitled to capital gains treatment.
The Service had attempted to argue that the entire gain from the cutting con-
tracts should have been taxed as ordinary income because of the failure to comply
with the six months holding period requirement. This argument was based on the
fact that both the lease and the cutting contract contained the same effective date.
It was argued that the timber "disposal" occurred on the same day as its acquisi-
tion. The case was distinguished from Springfield Plywood on factual grounds,
although the court noted that § 117(k) of the 1939 Code, the predecessor to the
current § 631(b) (which contains the same language in this regard as § 631(c)),
provided that "the date of disposal of such timber shall be deemed to be the date
such timber is cut."
115119801
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to wait one year before subleasing the property in order to be
entitled to capital gains treatment. In fact, the sublessor could
enter into a sublease immediately after it acquires the lease from
the landowner as long as the coal is mined more than one year
after that date. On the other hand, income from coal mined prior
to the end of the requisite holding period is subject to tax at ordi-
nary income tax rates, but is also subject to a deduction for
depletion.4 4
The regulations provide that a "successor to the interests of a
person" who has disposed of coal or iron ore under a contract by
virtue of which he retained an economic interest in the mineral is
also entitled to the benefits of section 631(c). 45 The Service in
Revenue Ruling 59-41646 interpreted the term "successor to the
interests of" as used in the regulations to include, among others,
(1) a devisee or legatee, (2) a purchaser of the whole or an undi-
vided interest of the original owner or sublessor, (3) a donee, and
(4) a shareholder whose interest is acquired upon the liquidation
of a corporation. The ruling also sets forth the following general
guidelines for determining the applicable holding period with re-
spect to the foregoing entities.
In the case of a devisee or legatee, the date of acquisition is
the date of the decedent's death rather than the date of distribu-
tion. The exact period during which the asset was held is com-
puted by excluding the date on which the asset was acquired and
including the date of disposal.
In the case of a purchaser of a whole interest or of an undi-
vided interest, the holding period would begin the day following
the date of acquisition. The day of acquisition is either the day
title passes or that day on which there is delivery of possession
and the privileges and burdens of ownership are assumed by the
purchaser, whichever occurs first.
In the case of a donee, the holding period begins the day af-
ter the date the property was acquired by the donor. However, if
the property had a value lower than the basis to the donor at the
date of gift and it is disposed of by the donee for less than such
44 Rev. Rul. 59-416, 1959-2 C.B. 159, 161.
"5 Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(b)(4)(i), T.D. 6841, 1965-2, C.B. 200.
46 1959-2 C.B. 159.
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value, the holding period of the donee begins the day after the
date of gift.
In the case of a qualified electing shareholder whose interest
is acquired through the liquidation of a corporation under section
333 and who has a substituted basis under section 334(c), the
holding period begins to run from the date the shareholder ac-
quires the stock of the liquidating corporation, excluding the date
of acquisition. If, however, the interest is acquired in a complete
liquidation under section 331 of the Code, there is a new holding
period which begins on the day after the liquidation. In the case
of a corporation whose interest is acquired in connection with a
reorganization as defined in section 368(a) and which has a sub-
stitute basis under section 362(b), the holding period for the
property begins on the day after the date of acquisition of the
property by the transferor corporation.
Revenue Ruling 59-416 also provides that the holding period
for a sublessor begins on the day after the effective* date of his
lease with the lessor or the day after he has assumed all of the
obligations and duties of a lessee, whichever occurs first. The
lessee who becomes a sublessor is not a successor in interest
within the meaning of section 631(c) of the Code and section
1.631-3(b)(4)(i) 4 7 of the treasury regulations.
2. Ownership Requirements
Section 631(c) by its terms applies only in the case of coal
royalties received by an "owner." However, the statute defines the
term "owner" as "any person who owns an economic interest in
coal or iron ore in place, including a sublessor."' A successor to
the interest of a person who has disposed of coal or iron ore under
a contract by virtue of which he retained an economic interest in
such coal or iron ore is also deemed to be an "owner" and there-
fore entitled to the benefits of section 631(c). 4 9
47 T.D. 6841, 1965-2 C.B. 200.
48 Accord, Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(b)(3)(ii)(a), T.D. 6841, 1965-2 C.B. 200.
Before the enactment of the 1954 Code, a sublessor did not receive the favorable
capital gains treatment. Rev. RuL 55-621, 1955-2 C.B. 277; Island Creek Coal Co.
v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 370 (1958).
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(b)(4)(i), T.D. 6841, 1965-2 C.B. 200. See also Rev.
Rul. 59-416, 1959-2 C.B. 159.
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The rents and royalties paid with respect to coal disposed of
by a sublessor under section 631(c) increase the" adjusted deple-
tion basis of the coal and are not otherwise deductible.50 In Joe C.
Davis5 °'1 the Tax Court recently ruled that a sublessor of coal
properties may not deduct under section 162 an advanced mini-
mum royalties payment paid to the lessor of coal properties. In
Davis the Tax Court held that the taxpayer sublessor had to
credit those advance minimum royalty payments against royalties
the taxpayers received from the sublessees which were treated as
long-term capital gains under section 631(c). For example, sup-
pose the owner of coal lands leases the property to a taxpayer
who in turn leases the property to a coal mining company. As-
sume the sublessor-taxpayer pays the owner of the coal fifty cents
per ton royalty for coal extracted and the lessee coal mining com-
pany pays the taxpayer a royalty of seventy-five cents per ton.
The amount realized by the taxpayer-sublessor under section
631(c) is seventy-five cents per ton. This amount will be reduced
by the adjusted depletion basis of fifty cents per ton, leaving a
gain of twenty-five cents per ton taxable at capital gain rates
under section 631(c) but without the benefit of percentage
depletion.51
The foregoing example involving three parties-landowner,
sublessor, and lessee mining company-is a typical situation in
which questions under section 631(c) arise. The dispositions of
the coal from the landowner to the sublessor and from the subles-
sor to the mining company will qualify for section 631(c) treat-
ment provided the other requirements of the statute are met in
addition to the ownership requirement. The sale of the coal by
the coal mining company-lessee will not qualify for capital gains
treatment under section 631(c). In fact, the statute specifically
states that its benefits do not apply to income realized by any
owner as a "co-adventurer, partner or principal in the mining of
such coal or iron ore." Hence, any taxpayer entity that is involved
in the mining of the coal, or shares in the risks of such mining as
a co-adventurer or partner, may not be entitled to the benefits of
section 631(c). Instead the proceeds from the sales of the coal by
80 Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(b)(3)(ii)(a), T.D. 6841, 1965-2 C.B. 200. See also Joe
C. Davis, 74 T.C. 66 (1980).
-1 74 T.C. 66 (1980).
81 See also Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(b)(3)(ii)(b), T.D. 6841, 1965-2 C.B. 200.
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the coal mining company-lessee are treated as ordinary income,
subject to the applicable depletion deduction. It should here
again be noted that the owner is not entitled to the allowance for
percentage depletion provided in section 613 with respect to any
coal disposed of under section 631(c).52
Given these rules as the framework for tax planning, it is ob-
viously essential in structuring a coal transaction to properly ana-
lyze the most favorable tax consequences for the respective par-
ties involved. Each taxpayer must determine which type of tax
treatment-i.e. capital gains treatment without the benefit of per-
centage depletion or ordinary income treatment with the benefit
of percentage depletion-is most favorable under the particular
circumstances at hand. The answer to this question may vary
with the particular taxpayer involved, the entity involved, and
other extraneous tax considerations peculiar to that taxpayer. As
a general rule, capital gains treatment will be the more beneficial
of the two. However, this is not always the case, and the taxpayer
should definitely make the requisite calculations in order to make
this decision prior to structuring the transaction. 3
It should be noted that the section 631(c) coal royalties paid
by the lessee are excluded from its gross income from mining for
the purposes of computing its percentage depletion allowable
under section 613. For instance, in the prior example, if the
lessee-coal mining company mines 100,000 tons of coal and sells it
for $30.00 per ton, the percentage depletion would be computed
as follows. In computing "gross income from the property" for the
year, the lessee would subtract $75,000 (100,000 tons X 750 roy-
alty per ton) from the $3,000,000 (100,000 tons X $30 per ton).
The lessee's allowable percentage depletion deduction (without
reference to the fifty percent limitation based on taxable income
from the property) for the year would be $292,500 [($3,000,000 -
$75,000) X 10%]." It should also be noted that advanced royal-
ties which a taxpayer pays under a coal lease and elects to deduct
from gross income in the year of payment must likewise be ex-
:2 See note 35 supra.
3 For an illustration of the comparative calculations in two different situa-
tions, see Haspel & Sumner, Acquisition of Coal Property Interests: Some Fed-
eral Tax Planning Observations, in this issue, infra.
4 I.R.C. § 613(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(4), -2(c)(5), T.D. 6446, 1960-1 C.B.
208, T.D. 6841, 1965-2 C.B. 200.
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cluded from gross income from the property for purposes of com-
puting percentage depletion for the subsequent year in which the
mineral is produced and sold.5
3. Disposition Requirement
Section 631(c) applies only to an owner who has disposed of
the coal while retaining an economic interest in the mineral after
the disposition. A person who merely acquires an economic inter-
est but who has not disposed of coal under a contract retaining an
economic interest does not qualify under the statute.5 Thus, an
outright sale of the mineral deposit in place would convey all of
the owner's economic interest in the property and would prevent
section 631(c) from applying.
Advance royalty payments and minimum royalty payments
contained in the typical coal lease and received by an owner of
coal qualify for capital gains treatment under section 631(c), pro-
vided the contract of disposal grants to the lessee the right to
apply such royalties to the payment of coal mined at a later
time. 7 In fact, the Internal Revenue Service has promulgated
guidelines governing the issuance of advance rulings on the ques-
tion of whether bonuses and advance royalties received by a les-
sor qualify for section 631(c) treatment."8
To illustrate the foregoing rule, suppose a taxpayer leased a
certain coal property from a landowner on January 1, 1980. On
January 2, 1980, the taxpayer entered into a contract of disposal
(a sublease) providing that mining would begin January 3, 1981.
Assuming the mining actually begins no earlier, all of the pay-
ments received by the taxpayer qualify under section 631(c), in-
cluding any payments made prior to January 3, 1981. However, if
the right to mine coal under the contract expires, terminates, or is
abandoned before the coal is mined, the taxpayer will have to
treat any payments attributable to the unmined coal as ordinary
income, not qualifying as capital gains under section 631(c). This
would require the taxpayer to recompute his tax liability on an
Rev. RuL 79-386, 1979-2 C.B. 246.
Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(b)(4)(i), T.D. 6841, 1965-2 C.B. 200.
'" Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(c)(1)(i), T.D. 6841, 1965-2 C.B. 200.
" Rev. Proc. 77-11, 1977-1 C.B. 568.
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amended return.5 9 In addition to advance payments and mini-
mum royalties, bonuses may also be given section 631(c) treat-
ment.8 0
In Revenue Ruling 77-84, 61 the Service reviewed three differ-
ent fact situations for the purpose of determining the applicabil-
ity of section 631(c) as affected by the disposition requirement. In
one situation, an individual received a royalty interest in a coal
lease from a mining company for services performed in connec-
tion with obtaining the lease for the mining company. In the sec-
ond situation, an individual received a royalty interest in a coal
lease from a coal company for services performed in negotiating
and obtaining certain other coal leases for the mining company.
In the third situation examined, an individual who had obtained
coal leases for a coal company was compensated by payments de-
termined by a rate per ton of coal purchased and processed by
the mining company.
The Service ruled in all three instances that none of the roy-
alty payments were subject to capital gains treatment under sec-
tion 631(c). In the first and second situations, the Service ruled
that the royalty payments were not subject to capital gains treat-
ment, but were ordinary income subject to percentage depletion.
In the third situation, the amounts received by the individual
were not subject to capital gains treatment but were ordinary in-
come not subject to depletion. The distinction between situations
one, two and three was that the individual in situations one and
two was deemed to have acquired an interest in the minerals in
place and was to secure income derived from the extraction of the
minerals, whereas in situation three the individual was merely to
receive future payments measured by the amount of coal pur-
chased by the mining company from a third party and processed
through the mining company's preparation plant, rather than
having acquired an interest in the minerals in place and receiving
income measured by the amount of coal extracted.
The Tax Court in Cline v. Commissioner 2 reviewed a set of
circumstances similar in many ways to the fact situations
Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(e)(2), T.D. 6841, 1965-2 C.B. 200.
Go Id. § 1.631-3(c)(3).
01 1977-1 C.B. 173.
62 67 T.C. 889 (1977).
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presented to the Service in the ruling just discussed. In the Cline
case, certain individuals acquired a royalty interest in certain
leases as the consideration for the negotiation of those coal leases
on behalf of the mine operator. Subsequently, the taxpayers and
the mine operator entered into a second contract whereby, in lieu
of the royalty interest on the coal mined from those specified
leases, the individuals would receive a lesser royalty on all of the
coal to be handled by the mine operator. The Tax Court deemed
the second agreement to have resulted in a sale or exchange of
the royalty interests briginally acquired by the taxpayer individu-
als under the original contract. Significantly, the Tax Court ruled
that the individuals did not retain an economic interest (within
the meaning of Section 631(c)) under the second contract and
therefore did not qualify for section 631(c) treatment. The Tax
Court went on to hold that the amounts received by the individu-
als under the second contract were taxable as gain from the sale
of a capital asset which, in that particular case, had not been held
for the requisite holding period. Finally, in a related type of ar-
rangement, the Service has ruled that royalty payments received
in exchange for an option to purchase coal lands are not subject
to capital gains treatment under section 631(c), but are taxable as
ordinary income subject to the depletion deduction.6 s
The foregoing general principles were again recently ad-
dressed in a private ruling letter issued by the Department of the
Treasury.6 In the private letter ruling, A, a wholly owned subsid-
iary of D, was formed to own and lease certain coal properties. B
was a wholly owned subsidiary of E, which, in turn, was a wholly
owned subsidiary of D as well. B was formed to lease the coal
properties from A and to sublease these properties to C mining
company under certain lease agreements providing for minimum
payments.
Based on the foregoing fact situation, the Service ruled that
the interest to be retained by A under the A lease with B was an
economic interest of an "owner" within the meaning of section
631(c). Since A was not an active participant in the production of
coal, royalty income received by A qualified as income from the
sale of coal subject to the treatment provided under sections
Rev. Rul. 73-80, 1973-1 C.B. 308.
- P.L. Rul. 7826085, [1978] FED. TAxEs (P-H) 2075.
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631(c) and 1231. The interest to be retained by B under the sub-
lease to C was also deemed to be an economic interest of an
"owner" within the meaning of section 631(c), and so that entity
received the same treatment accorded to A in the lease with B.
The Service also indicated that the minimum payments re-
ceived or accrued by B with respect to coal leased under a certain
sublease with C, and not applied as a credit against payment for
coal subsequently mined, constituted ordinary income. In such
case, B would be required to recompute its tax liability for the
taxable year such payments were received, in accordance with the
applicable regulations.6 5
C. Distinctions Between Surface and Mineral Ownership
Under Section 631(c).
In determining the applicability of Section 631(c) to a partic-
ular transaction, it is crucial to distinguish between the surface
and mineral interests to the coal properties.66 If there has been a
severance of the surface and mineral interests, only the royalties
paid with respect to the mineral interests are entitled to section
631(c) treatment. Royalty payments made to the surface owners
will have to be treated as ordinary income. However, based on the
case law, it would appear that this ordinary income should be
subject to the benefit of the applicable ten percent percentage de-
pletion deduction.
A situation involving a division of royalty payments between
the surface and mineral owners was presented to a United States
District Court in Kentucky in 1962. In Omer v. United States,6 7
the taxpayers owned the surface but had no title to the coal in
place. The predecessor in title had conveyed the mineral interest
to a coal company, thereby severing ownership of the minerals
from ownership of the surface. In 1956, the taxpayers executed a
five-year written lease to an individual lessee, providing that "if
the Lessee secures the right to mine and remove said coal" from
the owners thereof, the lessee was granted the right to use the
65 Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(c)(2), T.D. 6841, 1965-2 C.B. 200.
" See, e.g., Martin v. United States, 409 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1969); Omer v.
United States, 329 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1964).
67 Omer v. United States, 63-1 STAN. FED. TAx REP. (U.S. Tax Cas.) (CCH)
S 9113 (W.D. Ky. 1962), afl'd, 329 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1964).
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surface of the lands and the strata overlying the coal for the pur-
pose of mining and removing the coal by strip mining.
Under the terms of the lease, the taxpayers in Omer were to
be paid twelve cents for each ton of coal mined and sold from the
leased premises. The royalties received by the taxpayers were re-
ported as capital gains, upon the theory that section 631(c) ap-
plied to the transaction. Both the district court and the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the
taxpayers did not own the coal or any economic interest therein
at the time of the execution of the lease to the individual lessee
and, under the terms of the lease, made no "disposal of coal"
within the meaning of section 631(c). Therefore, the taxpayers
were not entitled to capital gains treatment, and the royalty pay-
ments were deemed to be ordinary income.
An interesting point in Omer is that the taxpayers were able
to take a depletion deduction on this ordinary income. The court
appeared to be making a distinction between economic interest
for purposes of section 631(c) and for purposes of the depletion
deduction. In order to be able to take a depletion deduction, it is
essential that the taxpayer establish that it has "an economic in-
terest" in the coal in place. 8 Apparently, the Service felt that it
had to make this concession to the taxpayers. Although the dis-
trict court did not address this point, the Sixth Circuit made the
following statement in a footnote to its decision:
The brief of appellee contains the following explanation of this
allowance:
"Because of the apparent hardship to the taxpayers in view of
the probable destruction of their land by the strip-mining op-
eration and because Southwest Expl. Co. may possibly justify a
conclusion that the taxpayers acquired an economic interest in
the coal in place in the transaction with Badgett, the Commis-
sioner conceded in the District Court that the taxpayers are
entitled to a depletion allowance. That concession has been
taken into account in the judgment." '
It is important'to note the distinction that the district court
and the Sixth Circuit were making in Omer between the economic
" 329 F.2d at 395 (based upon the principles governing depletion as specified
in the Internal Revenue Code).
19 Id. at 395 n.2.
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interest requirement under section 631(c) and the economic inter-
est requirement under section 611. Although the taxpayers did
not have an economic interest in the coal justifying section 631(c)
treatment, the courts determined that they did have an economic
interest in the coal such as to entitle them to the depletion
allowance.
In Martin v. United States,70 the Sixth Circuit was again
faced with this issue. In the Martin case, the lessor leased coal
properties on which it owned both the surface and mineral inter-
ests and, in addition, leased certain areas on which it owned only
the surface rights. The taxpayer as lessor claimed capital gains
treatment under section 631(c) on all of the royalties received for
the leased property, arguing that his circumstances were distin-
guishable from Omer in that, in the Omer case, the taxpayer did
not own any interests in the minerals underlying the surface
lands. The district court held that the taxpayer was entitled to
capital gains treatment on the royalties recieved from the surface
mining. The Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision on
appeal, holding that the payments received under a portion of the
contract were merely for the use of the surface of the land and
that there was not a disposal of the coal within the meaning of
section 631(c) to that extent. That court further observed that
although in Omer the taxpayer owned only the surface rights in
the land in question, the rationale of that case mandated a simi-
lar determination with regard to the applicability of section
631(c).
The court of appeals in Martin failed to discuss the question
of whether the ordinary income received by the lessor for leasing
the surface rights should have been subject to the depletion de-
duction. The court simply referred to the result in Omer where an
allowance was given to the taxpayer for depletion. Hence, the case
law under Omer and Martin made clear that section 631(c) ap-
plies only to the disposition of coal interests and does not apply
to the disposition of "surface rights."
The Service in its rulings has followed the principle enunci-
ated by the Sixth Circuit in the Martin and Omer cases. In Reve-
nue Ruling 79-144,71 the taxpayer, as lessor, had entered into two
70 409 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1969).
71 1979-1 C.B. 219.
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coal leases with a coal mining company. The first lease was a coal
lease of ten acres by which the coal mining company acquired the
right to mine coal subject to the payment of a royalty of a certain
fixed amount per ton for coal mined. The second lease was a lease
of the surface by which the coal mining company acquired the
right to enter upon, use, and destroy the surface of one hundred
acres of real property owned by the taxpayer for the purpose of
prospecting for coal. As consideration for the latter lease, the coal
mining company agreed to pay the taxpayer royalties for any coal
mined by the company from under the one hundred acres. The
original ten acre tract was under a portion of the hundred acre
tract covered by the surface lease. The question presented the
Service was whether royalty payments received under the surface
lease were subject to section 631(c) treatment.
The Service ruled that the taxpayer, as a result of having en-
tered into the surface lease, received or would receive a royalty
interest in the coal that underlay the area covered by the surface
lease when the mining company acquired the right to extract the
coal. This royalty income was held to be ordinary income received
in return for the right to use the surface overlying such coal.
Under the terms of the lease there was no "disposal of coal"
within the meaning of section 631(c). Hence, the royalty pay-
ments received by the taxpayer from the lease of the surface
lands were not proceeds from the disposal of coal under section
631(c).
The Service has also addressed this issue in a recent private
letter ruling.72 In that instance the taxpayer was the owner of cer-
tain surface land and the underlying coal rights. The taxpayer
granted to a mining company the right to extract coal from the
property in addition to the rights of ingress and egress over the
surface lands while performing such extraction. The contract
agreement called for payment by the mining company of a certain
amount per ton of coal mined from the property. The agreement
contained the standard reclamation clauses and escalation provi-
sions. The question presented to the Service was whether the
owner-lessor of the combined surface and coal lands could treat
the entire proceeds received from the lessee-mining company as a
disposal of coal subject to section 631(c) treatment or had to ap-
72 P.L. Rul. 7905006, [1979] FED. TAXES (P-H) 1 444.
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portion a part of the proceeds and treat them as "rental" receipts
for use of the surface lands by the coal company-lessee.
Significantly, the Service ruled that the taxpayer could treat
the payments made by the mining company as a disposal of coal
subject to the provisions of sections 631(c) and 1231 of the Code.
The Service further ruled that no portion had to be allocated to
rental receipts for use of the surface lands by the mining com-
pany. In comparing these cases it should be noted that there was
only one lease involved in this private letter ruling, whereas two
lease agreements were involved in Revenue Ruling 79-144 (dis-
cussed above).
IV. SECTION 631(c) TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN RELATED
TAXPAYERS
There is perhaps no more controversial area under section
631(c) than the question of its applicability to transactions be-
tween related taxpayers. This area is of critical concern, since
many taxpayers seek to obtain the benefits of both capital gain
treatment and the depletion allowance. This goal of obtaining the
benefits of both statutory provisions can be accomplished by
utilizing different taxpayer entities for various functions. For ex-
ample, one corporaton or entity may engage in leasing the coal
properties while another corporation may actually be engaged in
the mining of the coal. The question arises whether a lease be-
tween one taxpayer (as lessor), seeking to obtain the capital gains
benefit of section 631(c), and a related taxpayer (as lessee-miner),
attempting to obtain the benefits of the depletion allowance, is
permissible.
The provisions of section 631(c) do not apply to income real-
ized by "any owner as a co-adventurer, partner, or principal in
the mining of [the] coal."7 3 By this provision, Congress intended
to differentiate a lessor entitled to receive royalties from a person
participating in the operation of the mine.7 4 However, the legis-
lative history of the statute indicates that the Senate Finance
Committee rejected an attempt to indicate that the statute's pro-
visions would be inapplicable if the "owner of the coal was per-
73 LR.C. § 631(c).
74 S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 43, reprinted in [1951] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2013.
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sonally obligated to share a cost of the mining operations. '75
Thus, the statutory prohibition in section 631(c) raises the
broader question of the applicability of section 631(c) to transac-
tions between related taxpayers.
In the context of related taxpayers, it is significant to note
that the statute distinguishes dispositions of iron ore from dispo-
sitions of coal. In this regard, the statute specifically states that it
shall not apply to any disposal of iron ore-(1) to a person
whose relationship to the person disposing of such iron ore
would result in the disallowance of losses under section 267 or
707(b), or (2) to a person owned or controlled directly or indi-
rectly by the same interests which own or control the person
disposing of such iron ore .7
The Service has expressly ruled that section 631(c) is inappli-
cable to a transaction between related taxpayers where iron ore is
involved. 77 In Revenue Ruling 71-14078 the Service was presented
with the question of whether royalty payments received by a cost
company stockholder qualified for section 631(c) treatment. The
cost company was a corporation with three equal stockholder
participants. It was organized to mine certain natural iron ore de-
posits. The three stockholder participants were unrelated parties
which owned the company in equal shares pursuant to a contract
which provided, inter alia, that the stockholder participants ad-
vance all funds, both capital and operative, necessary for the
company to operate and share the iron ore produced in the same
proportion. One of the stockholder participants in the captive
mining company owned in fee certain natural deposits of iron ore.
The taxpayer also held leasehold rights to certain iron ore depos-
its. The taxpayer in turn leased the fee and subleased the lease-
hold properties to the captive mining company in return for a
7 Id.
78 I.R.C. § 631(c). These special rules for iron ore were written into the stat-
ute by Congress in 1964 when iron ore was added to the provisions of § 631(c). S.
REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 1st Seas. 253 (1964); H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 93 (1964).
Section 267 deals with the disallowance of deductions between related tax-
payers, while § 707(b) deals with the disallowance of deductions between a part-
nership and a controlling partner or two partnerships in which the same persons
own directly or indirectly more than 50% of the capital interests.
7 Rev. Rul. 71-140, 1971-1 C.B. 161.
78 Id.
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royalty amount per ton of iron ore mined. The Service ruled that
the proceeds under that lease did not qualify for section 631(c)
treatment as a result of the special language in the statute pre-
cluding its applicability to a situation involving related taxpayers.
Although Congress saw fit to make section 631(c) inapplica-
ble to transactions between related taxpayers with respect to iron
ore, it is significant to note that Congress did not at that time
include coal in this prohibition. Coal is conspicuously absent from
the exclusionary language in the statute. Thus, there is in fact an
implied approval for the disposal of coal to a person owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests which own
or control the entity disposing of the coal. The only prohibition
would be that the party receiving the royalty proceeds must not
be deemed a "co-adventurer, partner or principal in the mining of
such coal," which would fall within the statutory restriction.
In Brown v. Commissoner, 7  the Tax Court was presented
with a situation in which two partners in a partnership owning a
number of coal leases contracted with a coal mining corporation
to mine the coal for the partnership. Each of the partners owned
fifty percent of the stock in the mining corporation. The specific
question before the court was whether the mining corporation ob-
tained an economic interest in the coal in place (as a result of the
mining contract) entitling it to a deduction for depletion. The
court held that the corporation was entitled to the depletion de-
duction on its income. It is interesting to note that no question
was even raised with respect to the relationship of the parties.
The case unfortunately did not address the impact of this rela-
tionship upon the application of section 631(c).
However, it was not long before the question was directly ad-
dressed. In 1962, the applicability of section 631(c) to the disposal
of coal between related taxpayers was considered by the Tax
Court. In Keller Mines, Inc. v. Commissioner,"0 a partnership
held leases on various coal properties for which it paid a royalty
of thirty cents per ton to the landowners. These leases were in
turn assigned to a corporation for a royalty payment of fifty cents
per ton. The two partners in the subleasing partnership owned
and controlled the corporation. The difference between the
70 22 T.C. 58 (1954), acquiescence, 1954-2 C.B. 3.
80 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 142 (1962).
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amounts the partnership received and the amounts it paid to the
landowners was treated by the taxpayers as capital gain income
under section 631(c). The partners reflected their proportionate
share thereof in their individual joint income tax returns for the
taxable years in question.
The Service took the position that the partners were not en-
titled to use section 631(c) and accordingly denied capital gains
treatment on the twenty cent overriding royalty. The Service fur-
ther contended that the partners' distributive shares should be
treated as dividends. This would have resulted in the fifty cents
per ton royalties paid to the partnership being treated as ordinary
income without the benefit of any depletion deduction.
The Tax Court in Keller Mines held that the difference be-
tween the two royalties was a capital gain to the partners and not
a dividend from the corporation, since a fair and reasonable roy-
alty payment between unrelated parties would have been fifty
cents per ton of coal. It is especially interesting to note that this
decision came just two years before the special provisions relating
to iron ore were added to the statute. Therefore, the subsequent
enactment by Congress of the special rules for iron ore, but not
for coal, reinforces the position taken by the Tax Court in Keller
Mines."1
The Tax Court was again presented with this question in
Merritt v. Commissioner.82 There the taxpayer acquired leases on
coal properties and then subleased the coal properties to Paragon
Mining Company for overriding royalties. The sublessor-taxpayer
was the principal stockholder in Paragon. Paragon claimed the
deductions for the amounts paid to the taxpayer, its principal
stockholder, as coal royalties. The taxpayer reported the amounts
received from the corporation in excess of the royalties he paid
others as overriding royalties taxable as capital gains under sec-
tion 631(c).
81 Commentators had also taken the position that it was permissible under
§ 631(c) for related taxpayers to enter into coal lease transactions and obtain the
capital gain benefits. See, e.g., Bohannon, Tax Treatment of Gains and Losses in
Timber and Coal Transactions, 27 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 37, 47 (1958).
82 39 T.C. 257 (1962), revd on other grounds, 330 F.2d 161 (1964), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624
(1965).
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The Service in Merritt disallowed the royalty paid by Para-
gon to the taxpayer as a business expense deduction for the cor-
poration and denied the taxpayer the benefit of capital gains
treatment on the overriding royalty. Essentially, it was the Ser-
vice's position that the amounts in controversy paid to the tax-
payer by the corporation constituted dividends, taxable as ordi-
nary income, and were thus non-deductible items for the cor-
poration as well. The Service, while not attacking the existence of
the corporation as a separate taxable entity, did claim that the
payments of overriding royalties by the corporation to the tax-
payer were unreasonable in amount.
The Tax Court in Merritt determined that twenty-five cents
of the thirty cents per ton overriding royalty paid by the corpora-
tion to the taxpayer as controlling stockholder was reasonable in
amount and deductible as a business expense. In addition, the
Tax Court in the Merritt case determined that the difference be-
tween the twenty-five cents, which constituted a reasonable roy-
alty payment from the corporation to the taxpayer, and the royal-
ties the taxpayer paid to the landowners was taxable to the
taxpayer as capital gains under section 631(c). The court went on
to hold that five cents of the thirty cents per ton royalty paid by
the corporation to the controlling stockholder was a dividend dis-
tribution, taxable as ordinary income and not deductible by the
corporation as a business expense. The court indicated that a
stockholder may deal with his control corporation and that trans-
actions entered into between them may be accorded recognition
for tax purposes. However, such transactions will warrant close
scrutiny by the Service to determine whether they are mere artifi-
cialities contrived as a disguise for the distribution of corporate
earnings. This decision by the Tax Court was subsequently af-
firmed by the United States Supreme Court in the famous Para-
gon Jewel decision.8
In Valley Camp Coal Co. v. Commissioner," the Tax Court
and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied section 631(c)
treatment to a lease transaction between Valley Camp Coal Com-
pany and one of its subsidiaries. There, Valley Camp entered into
an agreement with one of its several subsidiaries, Bethany, which
83 Id.
26 T.C.M. (CCH) 1147 (1967), afl'd, 405 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1969).
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was a holding company formed to hold titles to inactive, reserve
coal lands. In 1959, Valley Camp completed negotiations with an
unrelated corporation from which it had been leasing certain coal
mining properties. It had entered into negotiation to purchase a
fee interest in the coal properties and arranged for the title to be
transferred to Bethany. The selling corporation aggeed to sell the
property for approximately $750,000. Valley Camp transferred
this amount to Bethany, since Bethany at the time did not have
any capital to use in making such purchase. After Bethany took
title to the property, Valley Camp entered into a coal lease agree-
ment with Bethany in which Valley Camp paid lease royalties to
Bethany in an amount of $50,000 and deducted that amount from
its income.
Based on these facts, the Tax Court ruled that Bethany was
merely a conduit through which Valley Camp paid the seller the
purchase price. As such, Valley Camp was not entitled to a de-
duction for alleged coal royalty payments to Bethany under the
lease but rather was relegated to an increase in its depletion de-
duction. Thus, the court determined that the transaction was en-
tirely artificial and entered into merely for tax purposes. As a re-
sult, the court ruled that section 631(c) did not apply to the
transaction. The artificiality of the transaction and the gravity of
the depletion of the Federal Treasury. coffers apparently was too
much for the Tax Court to bear. Once again the court stressed the
importance of reasonableness and business purpose previously
emphasized in the Keller Mines and Merritt decisions.
In Lucas Estate v. Commissioner,"5 the Tax Court held that
all of the royalty payments between related parties constituted an
indirect dividend and did not qualify for capital gain treatment
under section 631(c). The court based its decision on the fact that
the taxpayers could not present any evidence with respect to the
reasonableness of the royalties paid. Because such evidence was
lacking, the court held that all of the payments constituted divi-
dends subject to ordinary income treatment.
The Service in a revenue ruling has followed the Tax Court's
view that mere stock ownership in the lessee will not render the
lessor-owner (sublessor) a "co-adventurer, partner, or principal"
85 71 T.C. 838 (1979).
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in the mining operation. 6 In Revenue Ruling 73-33,87 advice was
requested as to whether coal royalties received by the lessor were
subject to section 631(c) treatment. There, a power company
leased its coal lands, which had been held for the requisite hold-
ing period, to a joint venture formed for the purpose of mining
the coal. One of the members of the joint venture was a wholly
owned subsidiary of the power company. The other member of
the joint venture was an unrelated mining company. The joint
venture paid a fair and reasonable royalty to the power company
for the coal mined. Simultaneously with the execution of the coal
lease, the joint venture entered into a coal supply agreement,
whereby the power company agreed to buy coal from the joint
venture to meet all of the requirements of one of its power
plants.88 Despite the relationship between the lessor and lessee,
the Service ruled that the royalty income of the power company
from the coal lease was entitled to capital gains treatment under
section 631. In so ruling, the Service made the following
comments:
The terms co-adventurer, partner, or principal imply a sharing
of the risks and control of a mining venture so that income to
such taxpayer is derived from the direct operation of a mine
rather than passive income as a lessor or sublessor retaining an
economic interest. The power company has no direct control of
the mining operation and does not share in the risk of mining.
The income of the power company is that of a lessor and, as
such, is passive income arising from the retention of its eco-
nomic interest upon leasing its coal lands.8 '
In Revenue Ruling 74-10,9o advice was requested on whether
section 631(c) applied to transactions between members of an af-
filiated group filing consolidated returns and, if so, whether the
transactions were deferred inter-company transactions in comput-
ing the consolidated taxable income. Corporation X was the own-
er of the coal properties and corporation Y was engaged in the
- Rev. Rul. 74-10, 1974-1 C.B. 251; Rev. Rul. 73-33, 1973-1 C.B. 307.
37 1973-1 C.B. 307.
In addition see Rev. Rul. 72-477, 1972-2 C.B. 310 for a similar fact situa-
tion. There, a utility company (lessor) was held entitled to capital gains treatment
under § 631(c) on royalties received from an unrelated coal mining company
(lessee).
1973-1 C.B. at 307-08.
1974-1 C.B. 251.
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mining of coal. In 1972, these corporations entered into an arms-
length coal lease agreement whereby X disposed of coal in place
to Y, which agreement was structured to come within the provi-
sions of section 631(c). The Service ruled that there was nothing
in the regulations which precluded the application of section
631(c) to amounts received by a member of an affiliated group
from another member of the group. The Service went on to rule
that the transaction was an "inter-company transaction" within
the meaning of section 1.1502-13(a)(1) of the treasury regulations
rather than a "deferred inter-company transaction" within the
meaning of section 1.1502-13(a)(2) of the regulations. This meant
that the gain realized by X corporation upon the disposal of the
coal in place to Y could not be eliminated in computing the con-
solidated taxable income of the affiliated group for 1972. Al-
though entitled to capital gain treatment on the royalties received
from Y, X, the owner-lessor, was not entitled to the percentage
depletion deduction. Y corporation was entitled to percentage de-
pletion as determined under section 613.
The Service has recently issued a private letter ruling recog-
nizing the applicability of section 631(c) to a related party trans-
action. 1 In that instance, the Service was presented with a fact
situation in which A, a wholly owned subsidiary of D, was formed
to own and lease certain coal properties. B was a wholly owned
subsidiary of E, which in turn was also a wholly owned subsidiary
of D. B leased the coal properties from A and in turn subleased
the properties to an unrelated mining company. In reviewing the
fact situation, the Service ruled that the interest retained by A
under the coal lease with B was an economic interest of an owner
within the meaning of section 631(c). Since A was not an active
participant in the production of coal, royalty income received by
A qualified as income from the sale of coal subject to the treat-
ment provided under section 631(c). The Service came to this re-
sult despite the fact that A and B were clearly related parties.
Thus, the statutory limitations on transactions between re-
lated taxpayers apply only in the case of iron ore and not to dis-
positions of coal. As far as the disposition of coal is concerned,
the relationship between the lessor and lessee is relevant only in
determining whether the owner is so intimately related as to be a
91 P.L. Rul. 7826085, [1978] FED. TAXEs (P-H) 1 2075.
[Vol. 82
32
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 4 [1980], Art. 44
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol82/iss4/44
TAX SYMPOSIUM
"co-adventurer, partner or principal in the mining" of the coal.
These terms require a sharing of the risks and control of the min-
ing venture such that the income to the owner is derived from
direct operation of the mine rather than as passive income re-
ceived by a lessor or sublessor retaining an economic interest. The
mere ownership of all of the stock in both the lessor (or sublessor)
and lessee mining company will not of itself render the lessor a
co-adventurer, partner, or principal in the mining operation, even
though, in the case of iron ore, such a relationship would prevent
the application of section 631(c).2 In the case of coal, if the royal-
ties which the sublessor receives are reasonable and the provi-
sions of the statute are otherwise met, then the transaction
should be subject to section 631(c) treatment. However, this ar-
rangement should be avoided if possible, since there is always the
potential for a determination that the royalties are unreasonable.
It is important to note in this regard that transactions between
related taxpayers always invite the close scrutiny of the Service.
Any amounts in excess of a reasonable royalty payment will prob-
ably be considered as dividend income, if paid by a corporation,
and subject to ordinary income rates without the benefit of the
depletion allowance, as noted in the Merritt case discussed
above.9 3 Furthermore, it seems highly probable that any losses
that the sublessor might attempt to deduct, based on royalty pay-
ments from its related lessee, would be subject to attack. The Ser-
vice might attempt to utilize section 267 or 707(b) to disallow
such losses.
V. STATUTORY PROVISIONS RELATED TO SECTION 631(c)
It is important to be aware of the relationship between sec-
tion 631(c) and various other Internal Revenue Code sections
such as those governing Subchapter S corporations, personal
holding companies,95 and the accumulated earnings tax.9 6 The
Code provides that a Subchapter S election will be terminated if,
for any taxable year of the corporation for which the election is in
effect, such corporation has "gross receipts more than twenty per-
92 Rev. Rul. 71-140, 1971-1 C.B. 161.
93 See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
- I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379.
95 I.R.C. §§ 541-547.
I.R.C. §§ 531-537.
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cent of which is passive investment income. '9 7 The term "passive
investment income" is defined in the Code to include royalties
received by a Subchapter S corporation."
This raises the question of whether a Subchapter S corpora-
tion should ever be used to make a disposal of coal.9 Signifi-
cantly, the regulations recognize that amounts received on the
disposal of coal pursuant to section 631(c) are not "royalties,"100
so corporations which have substantial income from such sources
will not be barred from use of the election as they would be if the
coal receipts were held to constitute royalties and amounted to
more than twenty percent of gross receipts. Hence, a Subchapter
S corporation could utilize the benefits of section 631(c) without
risking the termination of the corporation's election, but it is very
important to be cautious in this area. A subchapter S corporation
which disposes of coal without meeting the requirements of sec-
tion 631(c) will not only lose the benefits of capital gains treat-
ment but will also risk the termination of the corporation's elec-
tion if those royalties and other items of passive income, if any,
constitute more than twenty percent of the corporation's gross re-
ceipts. In addition, it should be remembered that a Subchapter S
corporation will not qualify for section 631(c) treatment if it is a
co-adventurer, partner or principal in the mining of the coal, and
that the disposal of the coal prior to the one year holding period
I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5)(A).
8 I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5)(C). This section provides that "the term passive invest-
ment income means gross receipts derived from royalties, rents, dividends, inter-
est, annuities, and sales or exchanges of stock or securities (gross receipts from
such sales or exchanges being taken into account for purposes of this paragraph
only to the extent of sales therefrom)."
"For a detailed examination of the tax consequences to a corporation and its
shareholders incurred by alternative disposal methods, see Southworth & Nix,
Federal Income Tax Aspects of the Disposition of Coal Interests by a Corpora-
tion, in this issue, infra.
100 Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(v), T.D. 6960, 1968-2 C.B. 342, provides in
pertinent part:
The term "royalties" as used in section 1372(e)(5) means all royalties,
including mineral, oil, and gas royalties, and amounts received for the
privilege of using patents, copyrights, secret processes and formulas,
good will, trademarks, trade brands, franchises, and other like property.
The term "royalties" does not include amounts received upon disposal
of timber, coal or domestic iron ore with a retained economic interest
with respect to which the special rules of section 631(b) and (c) apply.
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will not be entitled to section 631(c) treatment. If the royalties
received during this period amounted to more than twenty per-
cent of the corporation's gross receipts for that year, this fact
alone would result in the termination of the corporation's Sub-
chapter S status, with extremely adverse tax results.
Generally, there will be no problem in utilizing a Subchapter
S corporation's disposal of coal pursuant to section 631(c). How-
ever, Subchapter S status probably should be avoided if the coal
property is already held by a non-electing corporation. In that
case, code section 1378 will impose some penalty in the event the
corporation elects Subchapter S status. Prior to 1966 there was a
complete pass through to the shareholders of any capital gains
included in the taxable income of a Subchapter S corporation.
Section 1378, added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1966,101 im-
poses a capital gains tax on a Subchapter S corporation if for any
taxable year: (1) the corporation's capital gains exceed $25,000;
(2) such capital gain income constitutes more than fifty percent of
the corporation's taxable income; (3) the taxable income of such
corporation for such year exceeds $25,000;102 and (4) the Sub-
chapter S election has not been in effect for the three preceding
taxable years or since the formation of the corporation, if not in
existence for the preceding three years.103 Thus, a Subchapter S
corporation which owns coal property and has had an election in
effect for the three immediately preceding taxable years (or since
its inception) may dispose of the coal pursuant to section 631(c)
without fear of terminating its Subchapter S election or incurring
double taxation under section 1378.
Section 631(c) by its own terms has no application for pur-
poses of the accumulated earnings tax or the personal holding
company tax. Thus, for purposes of computing both the accumu-
lated earnings tax and the personal holding company tax, section
631(c) royalty payments constitute ordinary income, although this
ordinary income treatment raises the interesting question of
whether the lessor is entitled to deduct percentage depletion from
that ordinary income in computing these taxes.
The Service appears to have effectively closed the door to
101 Act of April 14, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-389, § 2, 80 Stat. 111.
102 I.R.C. § 1378(a).
103 I.R.C. § 1378(c).
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this approach by ruling that a corporation computing its taxable
income by taking into consideration the provisions of section
631(c) is not entitled to a deduction for percentage depletion in
determining its undistributed personal holding company income.
In Revenue Ruling 60-283,1o4 the Service examined a situation in
which a personal holding company owned coal bearing lands. Its
sole business activity was the leasing of these coal lands. The tax-
able income reported for purposes of the corporate income tax
was computed under the provisions of section 631(c). The posi-
tion of the Service was that the company was not entitled to a
deduction for percentage depletion in determining its undistrib-
uted personal holding company income. The Service noted that a
deduction for percentage depletion is not one of the statutory ad-
justments listed in section 545(b) for the purpose of determining
the undistributed personal holding company income and correla-
tive tax imposed upon such companies. Presumably, the princi-
ples announced in that ruling would be equally applicable to the
accumulated earnings tax.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It should be evident from the foregoing examination of sec-
tion 631(c) that this provision of the Internal Revenue Code is
critical in properly structuring any transaction relating to coal
property interests. The statute permits a taxpayer to obtain the
favorable capital gains tax treatment in circumstances that would
otherwise yield ordinary income under standard tax principles. In
addition, it is possible to gain the benefits of the provision in a
situation involving related parties if a legitimate business purpose
is demonstrated and royalty payments are reasonable. This provi-
sion of the tax law, which was an important tax concession in
1951, has become increasingly important today to all parties ac-
quiring and disposing of coal properties.
104 1960-2 C.B. 201.
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